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On Thin ICE: Cracking Down on the Racial
Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a
Compassionate Enforcement Policy
ABBY SULLIVAN*
Introduction
Since 2006 the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE")' has increasingly conducted workplace and
residence raids as a prominent mechanism for the enforcement of
immigration laws. 2  According to the Immigration Policy Center, a
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., 2000,
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gratefully recognize Richard Boswell, Jennifer Chac6n, Brian Lambert, and Dorothy Witt.
Finally, I thank the countless activists and defenders of immigrants' rights who collectively
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1. In the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the agencies formerly known as
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") and the United States Customs Service
("USCS") combined to form three departments, all of which now fall under the umbrella of the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). In addition to ICE, immigration agencies under
DHS are the United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"). As the agency primarily responsible for
immigration law enforcement, ICE defines its job as "enforc[ing] our immigration and customs
laws and . . . protect[ing] the United States against terrorist attacks . . . by targeting illegal
immigrants: the people, money and materials that support terrorism and other criminal activities."
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, About ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
2. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY07 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(2007), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/fyO7accmplshmntsweb.pdf;
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/pi/
news/factsheets /worksite.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). See also U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Immigration Enforcement Initiatives, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
factsheets/ immigration _enforcementinitiatives.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (citing increase
in workplace enforcement activities as part of ICE's "increased priority on targeting illegal
workers who have gained access to critical infrastructure worksites around the country"), NAT'L
NETWORK OF IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, OVER-RAIDED, UNDER SIEGE 1 (2008) (citing
a post-2006 increase in immigration sweeps in people's homes and workplaces as "the most
alarming trend" in recent ICE enforcement efforts).
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nonprofit immigration think tank, the immigration reform debate's
heavy focus on undocumented immigration has produced an
exaggerated emphasis on enforcement rather than an exploration of
possible additional pathways to legal immigration. 3 As Professors
Kevin Johnson and Bernard Trujillo explain, "the national security
fears that have gripped the United States since September 11 have
tended to drive the most popular reform proposals toward extreme
enforcement-oriented policies." 4  General disdain for immigrants,
compounded by post-September l1th fears, have led people to
inaccurately attribute the threat of terrorism to ordinary
immigration. 5
The post-September llth association of immigration and
terrorism propelled the House of Representatives to pass an
aggressive immigration bill that, among other things, made mere
illegal presence in the United States a felony. 6 After the House bill
could not command the votes in the Senate necessary to become law,
nor could the House and Senate agree on compromise legislation,
immigration reform at the legislative level failed.7 As President
George W. Bush had hoped comprehensive immigration reform
would form a pillar of his legacy, the Department of Homeland
Security became the Executive Branch's only hope to demonstrate to
the public that the government was responding to illegal
immigration. Increasingly aggressive ICE operations have become
the primary means for the federal government to convey this
message.
This note argues that flawed and discriminatory ICE policies
target the wrong people under the guise of protecting homeland
security, dismantling immigrant communities and families. These
policies have flowed from federal legislation that has increasingly
3. Walter A. Ewing, More Than a 'Temporary' Fix: The Role of Permanent Immigration in
Comprehensive Reform, (Immigration Policy Center, Washington D.C.), Jan. 2006, at 2.
4. Kevin R. Johnson and Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1369, 1372
(2007).
5. Id. at 1398.
6. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. § 20 1(a) (2005).
7. Robert Pear & Carl Huse, Immigrant Bill Dies in Senate; Defeat for Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2007, at Al.
8. See id.
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criminalized immigration, as well as the government and media's
fusion of immigrant status and criminality. Furthermore, United
States Supreme Court precedent has laid the groundwork for ICE to
engage in racist practices with few consequences. The Court's
decisions, which have vested ICE with vast discretion to adopt law
enforcement practices that would be illegal outside the immigration
context, should be revisited in light of their reliance on the
noncriminal nature of immigration enforcement and deportation
proceedings. Regardless of whether or not the Court places stricter
limitations on the use of racial profiling in immigration enforcement,
ICE should adopt enforcement guidelines that are consistent with its
mission to "protect America and uphold public safety." 9 As a sub-
agency of the Department of Homeland Security, ICE should
recognize that the interests of national security would be more
effectively advanced through "granting legalization and encouraging
the undocumented to surface," rather than an enforcement-oriented
approach that promotes the deportation of thousands of people who
pose no threat to national security.'
0
Part I of this note summarizes the constitutional framework in
which today's immigration law enforcement policies emerged,
focusing on the ways in which the Supreme Court has chipped away
at Fourth Amendment protections when it recognizes "special" law
enforcement needs such as immigration and border protection. Part
II demonstrates how the use of race as a tool to enforce immigration
law has further diminished immigrants' constitutional protection. In
Part III, this note argues that this use of race is compounded by the
Supreme Court's failure to deter police from violating immigrants'
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court's declaration that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible in
deportation proceedings represents an invitation for immigration
officials to violate the rights of immigrants.
Parts IV and V discuss the consequences of racial profiling in
immigration law enforcement in light of the increasing
criminalization of immigrant status. This official conflation of
9. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, About ICE, http://www.ice.gov/
about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
10. See BILL ONG HNG, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY 46-51 (2006).
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immigration and criminality is evident in recent federal legislation as
well as discretionary executive branch policies that both the
Department of Justice and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
have developed in recent years. In Part VI, this note highlights case
studies of immigrant families and communities who have suffered
from overly aggressive immigration law and policy. These case
studies demonstrate that this anti-immigrant aggression has
disproportionately harmed law abiding immigrants and deflected
attention from those who pose a legitimate threat to our national
security. Finally, Part VII proposes three possible avenues for
reform: the passage of humane legislation to address the needs and
rights of families and children subject to immigration law
enforcement; the formal institution of executive branch policies that
would require ICE to prudently exercise its prosecutorial discretion
when families are concerned; and lastly, the Court's application of
widely recognized constitutional norms to the immigration context.
I. The Constitutional Framework Governing
Immigration Enforcement
In its enforcement operations, ICE searches the residences,
workplaces, or vehicles of people who are suspected to be
undocumented immigrants. I Because ICE has not procured search
warrants before conducting the majority of these searches,' 2 agents
typically gain entry by obtaining consent from the subject of the
search. 13
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.", 4 However, for well over 100 years after the adoption of
11. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 8, 13 (2007),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ ice07arfinal.pdf.
12. NAT'L NETWORK OF IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, OVER-RAIDED, UNDER SIEGE
vi (2008).
13. Consent is a recognized exception to the general constitutional requirement that the
government not conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the Bill of Rights, the American judiciary had established no remedy
for Fourth Amendment violations; unlawfully seized evidence could
still be introduced against a defendant in both criminal and civil
proceedings. In 1914 the Supreme Court recognized that this
rendered the Fourth Amendment a mere formality, and established
the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States.Y Weeks held that
evidence seized by federal officers in violation of the Fourth
Amendment could not be introduced in a federal criminal case.
16
The Court based the exclusionary rule on its refusal to extend
judicial endorsement to unconstitutional executive action. 17
However, for almost fifty years, the rule excluded only evidence
seized during federal criminal investigations. In the 1961 case Mapp
v. Ohio, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states.
1 8
Despite the judiciary's attempt to curtail law enforcement
officers' violations of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule
has not proven to be a perfect remedy. In 1968, the Court
acknowledged in Terry v. Ohio that the judiciary is limited in its
ability to prevent police abuse: the exclusionary rule "is powerless to
deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the
police ... are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest
of serving some other goal."'19 The Terry Court went on to suggest
that this "other goal" is often the comprehensive harassment and
intimidation of minority groups.2
0
Terry involved a white police officer who suspected two Black
men and one white man of preparing to rob a store. 21 The officer
perceived the three men to be "thoroughly suspicious," 22 but he
articulated his suspicion little beyond "they didn't look right to
me. ''23 After the officer's observations led him to conclude that the
three men were dangerous, he approached them, asked their names,
and abruptly patted down Petitioner Terry, uncovering a pistol.
24
15. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16. Id. at 394.
17. Id.
18. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
19. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 6-7.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 7.
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Terry challenged this search as an unlawful search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Despite the Court's concession that the officer in Terry did not
have probable cause to search, the Court upheld the "stop and
frisk.",25 The Court stated that while a frisk is a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 26 "the scope of the particular
intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, [is] a central
element in the analysis of reasonableness."2 7 Acknowledging the
compelling government interests involved in the case, the Court
found that this search was "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 28
The Court accordingly held that "there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. 29
It is perhaps because the exclusionary rule would not prevent
"the wholesale [police] harassment ... of which minority groups...
frequently complain" 30 that the Court established the concept of a
"Terry stop and frisk," as it is commonly referred to today.
Ironically, notwithstanding the Court's recognition of the
pervasiveness of police harassment, Terry allows police officers to
stop and frisk an individual so long as they can construct, post hoc, a
reasonable basis for thinking the individual may have been armed or
dangerous. As such, the Terry Court diminished minorities'
protection from law enforcement's ongoing violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights.
Terry led to an avalanche of decisions in which the Court carved
out exceptions to the protection guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment. Most notable to the immigrant community, the Court
has upheld searches founded on less than probable cause when
conducted pursuant to a government program designed to address
25. Id. at 27-31.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
30. Id. at 14-15.
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"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.' 1
Border protection is one such recognized "special need."
32
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court consolidated four
criminal cases in which the defendants challenged the introduction of
evidence discovered at Border Patrol checkpoints.33 In three of the
four cases, border patrol agents stopped Latino drivers and
subsequently directed them to secondary inspection areas, where
agents discovered that passengers in the cars were undocumented.34
All three drivers were charged with various criminal offenses
involving the illegal smuggling of aliens.
35
In its analysis, the Court balanced individual and government
interests, noting that "[w]hile the need to make routine checkpoint
stops is great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests is quite limited. ' ' 6 Accordifigly, the Court held first, that "a
vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of
its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the particular
vehicle contains illegal aliens," 37 and second, that "the operation of a
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a judicial
warrant." 38 The twin holdings of Martinez-Fuerte do not directly
implicate race. However, the effects of these holdings on the
immigrant community are clear when viewed in light of the Court's
position that border patrol agents should be accorded "wide
discretion" in their border protection operations, and agents do not
violate the Constitution when they refer motorists for inspection
"largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry."
39
31. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
32. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
33. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
34. Id. at 547-48.
35. Id. at 547-49.
36. Id. at 557.
37. Id. at 545.
38. Id.
39. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563.
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II. Race as an Acceptable Consideration in
Immigration Enforcement
Although Terry and Martinez-Fuerte set up a structure under
which ICE agents have vast discretion in carrying out their
immigration law enforcement duties, this discretion is not completely
unchecked. In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed
the principle that "the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race."40  The Court has also
prohibited selective law enforcement insofar as it has a
"discriminatory effect and.. . [is] motivated by a discriminatory
purpose.",41 However, because the Court has relaxed constitutional
standards in the immigration context, 42 Whren's general prohibition
on racial profiling does not govern the context of immigration law
enforcement. Rather, lower constitutional standards have vested
immigration officers with extraordinary discretion in carrying out
enforcement operations. This relaxation of constitutional rules has
taken two primary forms. First, immigration officers may consider
race in enforcement decisions, and second, evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is rarely barred from admission
in deportation proceedings. These legal standards permit - indeed,
they encourage - immigration officials to enforce the law in a racist
manner.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, border patrol agents on a
roving patrol stopped a driver solely based on the fact that he
appeared to be of Mexican descent. 43  After questioning the
passengers and driver, the agents learned that they were
undocumented.44 The driver was subsequently charged with and
convicted for alien smuggling, a crime under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.45 Based on the "random basis" of the stop,46 the
Supreme Court held it to be unreasonable, stating that agents on
40. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
41. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (citing Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962)).
42. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
43. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 883.
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roving patrol cannot stop vehicles without "specific articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country." 47 As such, the evidence that formed the
basis for the criminal conviction was suppressed.
Despite the favorability of its holding to the individuals in the
case at hand, the Brignoni-Ponce Court opened the floodgates for
immigration agents to rely on race in their enforcement efforts in a
manner that would be impermissible for standard law enforcement
officers. The Court recognized that the vehicle occupants' apparent
Mexican descent alone justified "neither a reasonable belief that they
were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other
aliens who were illegally in the country.",48 However, although the
Brignoni-Ponce Court stated that Mexican ancestry alone would not
create sufficient basis to stop a car to inquire about its occupants'
immigration status, "the likelihood that any given person of Mexican
ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor."4 9  Indeed, one year after Brignoni-Ponce, the
Supreme Court held that Border Patrol agents' need for wide
discretion mandated the conclusion that "it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively. . . even if it be assumed that such referrals are
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry."
50
Regardless of the propriety of racial profiling and the
nebulousness of the term "Mexican appearance," one obvious
problem stemming from the Brignoni-Ponce holding is that with the
increase in the flow of immigration - both illegal and legal - over
the Mexican border, more people who have a "Mexican appearance"
are settling in the United States. 51 These individuals, as well as their
United States citizen children, will be more vulnerable than their
white counterparts to immigration enforcement efforts. Practically
47. Id. at 884.
48. Id. at 886.
49. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
50. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 573.
51. According to the United States Census Bureau, Hispanics made up 4.7 percent
of the United States population in 1970. By 2000, this number had nearly tripled
to 12.5 percent, and by the year 2010, Hispanics are projected to make up 15.5
percent of the population. By 2050, the projected Hispanic population is 24.4 percent. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemohispanic/hispanic-pop-presenti tion.html.
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speaking, Brignoni-Ponce is a judicial blessing of disparate treatment
based on race, and it stands for an invitation to ICE to engage in
racial profiling. Agents need only point to additional factors they
considered in combination with their reliance on racial profiling.
Moreover, the factors the Brignoni-Ponce Court listed as acceptable
complements to racial profiling do little to further deter immigration
agents' reliance on race. Among these factors are "mode of dress
and haircut,"' 52 as well as certain aspects of the vehicle such as the
number of passengers or the type of car. 53 Legal commentators have
criticized these factors as mere proxies for race and class. 54
Il. The Supreme Court's Failure to Apply the
Exclusionary Rule to Deportation Proceedings
Compounding the effects of a relaxed constitutional standard for
immigration agents who engage in racial profiling, the Court has
chipped away at the safeguards it has erected to deter Fourth
Amendment violations. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the
undocumented respondents attempted to apply the exclusionary rule
in their deportation proceedings, arguing for the suppression of
evidence the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
uncovered during an unlawful arrest. 55 The Court refused to extend
the exclusionary rule to the deportation context, reasoning that "[a]
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility
to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry.",56
Furthermore, unlike proceedings in which a person's past conduct
may subject them to criminal penalties, in a deportation proceeding,
"[p]ast conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on...
[one's] right to remain."' 57 The Court weighed the costs and benefits
of applying the exclusionary rule in the deportation context, and
found that the costs substantially outweighed the benefits. In
detailing the costs, the Court particularly stressed its view that
52. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Note and Comment: The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 843, 848 (1998).
55. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1035-38 (1984).
56. Id. at 1038.
57. Id. (citations omitted).
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barring evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment would
"compel the courts to release from custody persons who would then
immediately resume their commission of a crime through their
continuing, unlawful presence in this country."58
The Court's decision rested on myriad assumptions about the
common practice of immigration agents; in particular the Court had
no "good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS
officers were widespread., 59 As such, it rested its holding on the
caveat that the agents' conduct in question did not amount to
"egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that
might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained., 60 The Court went on to
note a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, which
held that the particular circumstances surrounding an arrest and
interrogation could require application of the exclusionary rule if
admission of the evidence constituted a "fundamentally unfair"
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
6 1
IV. Racial Profiling in the Immigration Context
These two limitations on the Fourth Amendment's protection
coincide substantially, in that they allow immigration agents vast
flexibility in their capacity to disparately target people of color.
Lopez-Mendoza and Brignoni-Ponce set the stage for immigration
officers to engage in racial profiling, provided that they are able to
frame their conduct as less than egregious. Such a loose standard has
prompted arguments that in the immigration context, Fourth
Amendment violations owing to lack of probable cause are always
egregious because they necessarily result from impermissible
consideration of race. 62  Furthermore, as immigrants from LatinAmerica settle and create families in the United States, Mexican
58. Id. at 1050.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1050-51.
61. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051, n.5 (citing Matter of Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343
(BIA 1980)).
62. Hafetz, supra note 54 at 845.
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appearance becomes less and less probative of immigration status,
rendering race an unreliable indicator. 63
Despite the mounting number of American citizens who would
fit the Brignoni-Ponce description of "apparent Mexican ancestry,"
in recent years the federal government has increasingly legitimized
immigration officials' reliance on race. In 2003, the Department of
Justice published a guidance document from then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft outlining the confines under which federal law
enforcement and immigration officers may consider race. 64 While
purporting to be a response to President Bush's proclamation that
racial profiling is "wrong and we will end it in America," 65 the
language of the guidance document accords federal immigration
officials, operating under the guise of national security concerns,
substantial flexibility in their consideration of race.
The guidance states that law enforcement efforts designed to
uphold border integrity "may necessarily involve a consideration of a
person's alienage in certain circumstances., 66 While the guidance
warns that border integrity may not be used as a pretext for
discrimination based on racial animus, it does not define what
constitutes border protection, and it does little to set clear boundaries
regarding what activities threaten border integrity.
For example, it details a hypothetical situation in which the FBI
is informed that a group is planning an assassination of the President,
and that the group members share the same ethnicity. Law
enforcement may "appropriately focus investigative attention on...
that ethnic insurgent group... who, based on other available
information, might conceivably be involved in planning some such
attack.",67 Such a loose standard vests ICE with immense discretion
63. Id. at 850-51; According to the United States Census Bureau, Hispanics made
up 4.7 percent of the United States population in 1970. By 2000, this number had
nearly tripled to 12.5 percent, and by the year 2010, Hispanics are projected to
make up 15.5 percent of the population. By 2050, the projection is 24.4 percent. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/hispanic-pop_ presentation.html.
64. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION: GUIDANCE REGARDING
THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance -on race.htm.
65. George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 27,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/ releases/ 2001/02/ 20010228.html.
66. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 64.
67. Id.
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to define the conduct that threatens national security and border
integrity. Because the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to
immigration officials' assessment of whether an individual poses a
threat to national security, 68 and "homeland security" has come to be
defined as "national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests
of the United States," 69 immigrants are increasingly vulnerable to
racial profiling in enforcement activities, regardless of whether or not
they have engaged in criminal activity. The Department of Justice
has facilitated the use of race in immigration enforcement in a
manner that would be impermissible in other forms of law
enforcement.70
While the guidance states that consideration of race is generally
impermissible when border integrity is not implicated, it begs the
question of what standard applies to federal investigation of
noncriminal activity - specifically, civil violations of immigration
laws. The guidance warns that consideration of race "runs the risk of
descending into reliance upon prohibited generalized stereotypes" if
an officer has no "reliable information that ties persons of a
particular description to a specific criminal incident, ongoing
criminal activity, or particular criminal organization.,' 71 However,
this policy does not address what has become a recent trend in
federal legislation as well as ICE's operations: the creative fusion of
enforcement of civil and criminal laws in the immigration context.
V. The Criminalization of Immigration
In construing deportation proceedings as purely civil, the Lopez-
Mendoza Court relied on the fact that an immigration judge presiding
68. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1981) (deferring to an immigration
officer's "inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person," in light of "the
enormous difficulties of patrolling a 2,000-mile open border and the patient skills needed by
those charged with halting illegal entry into this country").
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(d)(2) (2006).
70. See Jennifer Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
"Criminal Street Gang Member, "U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 339 (2007) [hereinafter Chac6n, Whose
Community Shield?] (noting that under the guidance's distinction between "traditional law
enforcement activities," in which consideration of race is impermissible, and "national security
and border integrity," in which race may be considered to the maximum extent permissible under
the Constitution and federal law, immigration falls in the latter context).
71. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, supra note 64.
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over such proceedings can only order deportation, and cannot
adjudicate guilt or impose criminal punishment.72 Because the
exclusionary rule is a component of a criminal procedure rooted in
establishing safeguards to protect criminal defendants, the Court's
ccnclusion of the inapplicability of the rule naturally follows its
construction of deportation proceedings as purely civil. However,
modem day immigration laws and policies that increasingly
criminalize immigrants based on their immigration status alone call
into question the entire foundation of the Lopez-Mendoza decision.
A. Criminal Prosecution for Social Security Fraud
A recent raid of an Iowa meatpacking plant illustrates modem
day immigration policy's heightened criminalization of immigrant
status. In May of 2008, ICE raided Agriprocessors, Inc. of Postville,
Iowa, carrying out the largest ever criminal enforcement operation of
a single workplace.73  Rather than shuttling the nearly 300
undocumented immigrants caught in the raid into deportation
proceedings, ICE turned over their information to the United States
Attorney's Office, who in turn criminally prosecuted them for social
security fraud.74 The raid has been characterized as "a national test
case for the Bush administration's crackdown strategy of bringing
criminal charges against illegal immigrants caught in workplace
raids.. . [rather than] swiftly deport[ing them] on civil immigration
violations."
' 75
The vast majority of the workers whom ICE apprehended in the
Agriprocessors raid pleaded guilty to knowingly using false Social
Security cards or legal residence documents to gain employment.
76
A Spanish interpreter who worked for the federal court in the wake
of the raid described the situation as a disaster that was "entirely
72. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
73. Julia Preston, Immigrants' Speedy Trials After Raid Become Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2008, at A 12 [hereinafter Preston, Speedy Trials].
74. See Julia Preston, 2 Supervisors Are Arrested After Sweep at Meat Plant, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2008, at A13.
75. Preston, Speedy Trials, supra note 73.
76. Julia Preston, An Interpreter Speaking Up for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at A I
[hereinafter Preston, Interpreter].
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man-made, 7 7 noting that "defense lawyers had little time or privacy
to meet with their court-assigned clients in the first hectic days after
the raid.",78 The interpreter, Erik Camayd-Freixas, observed that few
of the immigrants understood that they were entering guilty pleas and
accepting a sentence of criminal imprisonment, as opposed to
admitting that they had violated civil immigration laws. 79 He further
stated that, despite the fact that "'knowingly' and 'intent' are
necessary elements of the charges, [few of the defendants knew]
what a Social Security number was or what purpose it served." 80
The economic effects of this raid - which a local university
professor characterized as "absolutely devastating" 8' - would have
been highly detrimental to the town of Postville even if the
immigrants had not been criminally prosecuted. As Postville is a
small town with a population of only 2,200 people, 82 it lost over 10
percent of its population to this raid. Moreover, the raid shut down a
meatpacking plant that produces 60 percent of the kosher retail meat
and 40 percent of the kosher poultry nationally. 83  The federal
government's election to criminally prosecute those caught in the
raid only exacerbates these economic effects for the immigrants'
families, who will now watch their loved ones enter terms of
criminal incarceration before being deported. Mr. Camayd-Freixas's
profound comments encompass the inhumanity of this
criminalization: "Aside from their Guatemalan or Mexican
nationality, which was imposed on their people after Independence,
they too were Native Americans, in shackles."
84
77. Erik Camayd-Freixas, Ph.D., Interpreting after the Largest ICE Raid in US History: A
Personal Account (June 13, 2008) at 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/lI/us/Ilimmig.html?
scp=l&sq= an%20interpreter/o20speaking%20up&st=cse) (follow "14-page essay" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
78. Preston, Interpreter, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. Camayd-Freixas, supra note 77, at 6.
81. Susan Saulny, Hundreds Are Arrested in U.S. Sweep of Meat Plant, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2008, at A13.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Camayd-Freixas, supra note 77, at 2.
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B. The Crime of Illegal Reentry
It is a crime in the United States for a previously deported
individual to reenter the United States without first being granted
permission from the Attorney General. 5 At first blush, it appears
logical to prevent one who has broken our immigration laws from
returning. Despite this logic, there is an enormous difference
between an immigration court determining that someone is
removable after such reentry and a federal court deeming someone a
criminal strictly based on his or her presence in this country. Such a
criminal conviction subjects someone to a sentence of incarceration
ranging from two to twenty years, depending on the extent of the
individual's criminal history. 6
The crime of illegal reentry may be analogized to juvenile "status
crimes" such as curfew violation or underage drinking, which are
based on a notion that one's juvenile status restricts his or her rights
and liberties. But unlike juveniles, there is no rational basis to
restrict one's rights or liberties based on immigrant status, as our
legal system has long since recognized that immigrants have the
same fundamental rights as American citizens.8 7  This calls into
question the legality - or at least the wisdom - of the illegal reentry
statute, which essentially criminalizes immigrant status. Moreover,
because the prison sentence for illegal reentry may reach twenty
years, prosecutors should seek these convictions aggressively only in
the most exceptional cases.
Despite the questionable prudence of this practice, federal
prosecutors are increasingly prioritizing illegal reentry cases. The
available statistics demonstrate that the Department of Justice has
recently prioritized illegal reentry and other immigration cases in its
prosecution of federal crimes. For example, for the first eleven
months of fiscal year 2008, illegal reentry cases comprised one-third
of the felony caseload of Northern California's branch of the Federal
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2008).
86. Id.
87. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this
country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
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Public Defender. 88  The Transactional Records Access Clearing
house, a nonpartisan research organization based out of Syracuse
University, has published data that indicate that the 2008 monthly
rate of criminal prosecutions for immigration violations has been, on
average, 86 percent higher than the 2007 rate. 89  In 2008, illegal
reentry has been the primary charge in nearly 60 percent of the
immigration cases referred for criminal prosecution by the
Department of Homeland Security. 9°  Even more striking is a
comparison over a longer time period: the rate of immigration
prosecutions has risen over 195 percent since 2003.91
These numbers are consistent with data from recent years:
immigration prosecutions rose 82 percent between 2003 and 2004,92
and convictions for immigration crimes rose 70 percent. 93 During
the same period, immigration matters represented the largest
percentage (32 percent) of all federal criminal cases, edging out
narcotics crimes (27 percent) and handily surpassing weapons crimes
(9 percent). 94 Of the 15,546 convictions in district courts in 2004 for
immigration crimes, 59 percent were for illegal reentry. 95  These
statistics demonstrate that 2004 saw a notable leap in the number of
immigrants serving terms of incarceration in federal prison - for
returning to the country they consider their home - before being
deported from the United States.
Criminal attorneys have surmised that this jump in illegal reentry
prosecutions is due to a prosecutorial culture that prioritizes the
number of convictions over the quality of criminal justice. 96 Indeed,
illegal reentry cases tend to bolster United States Attorneys' volume
88. Interview with Geoff Hansen, Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender, Northern District
of California in San Francisco, September 3, 2008.
89. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC") Reports, Prosecutions for May
2008, available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/hsaa/ monthly may08/fil/.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC") Report on DHS Criminal
Immigration Enforcement (August 24, 2005), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/ latestl/131/.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Interview with Geoff Hansen, supra note 88; see also Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining
Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 42
(2007) ("[T]here is currently a fierce propitiatory attachment to high immigration prosecutions
statistics as a proxy for the aims of 'border security' and immigration control.").
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of convictions because a federal prosecutor may secure a conviction
by proving three simple elements: the defendant was previously
deported, never received permission to return to the United States,
and subsequently reentered. 97 Despite the minimal culpability of this
conduct, prosecutors have increasingly focused on illegal reentry in
order to produce a higher volume of "immigration deliverables" in
response to criticism of the federal government "for not doing
enough to enforce the border." 98 Geoff Hansen, the Chief Assistant
Federal Public Defender for Northern California, noted that starting
about ten years ago, "the U.S. Attorney's strategy for increasing his
office's immigration numbers was to go to California's prisons and
interview anyone with a Hispanic-sounding last name" for the
purpose of screening for illegal reentry. 99 Indeed, over 99 percent of
Northern California's illegal reentry defendants in 2008 have had
Latino surnames, which indicates that the U.S. Attorney's office is
engaging in the "race-based prosecution of Latin American
immigrants while ignoring the Canadians and other whites who are
in the United States illegally."' 100 Mr. Hansen further stated that the
past few years have seen "an unbelievable increase in the number of
illegal reentry cases .... These cases produce easy convictions, are
impossible to defend, and their heightened prosecution represents a
backwards prosecutorial ideology which values a high volume of
convictions over serving justice." 01
Sheer number of convictions should not be the mark of a
successful prosecutor's office, and the Department of Justice should
not target immigrants to forward the self-serving goal of
accumulating convictions. Instead of measuring success in terms of
expediency, a positive prosecutorial policy should "improve the
integrity of the system.. . [by] aim[ing] higher, at the more culpable,
rather than exhausting resources on collecting low-level players."'
0 2
As such, United States Attorneys would be prudent to shift their
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2008).
98. Fan, supra note 96 at 55-56, quoting Hearing on U.S. Attorney Firings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007), 2007 WL 927187 (testimony of D. Kyle Sampson,
former Chief of Staff to the Att'y Gen.).
99. Interview with Geoff Hansen, supra note 88.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Fan, supra note 96, at 45.
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misplaced focus on low-level illegal reentry suspects toward more
serious immigration crimes such as human trafficking.
C. The Immigration and Nationality Act's Aggravated Felony
Provision
In addition to the zealous prosecution of the benign offense of
illegal reentry, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("[NA" or "the
Act") itself has adopted language that paints immigrants as violent
criminals. Under the Act, an immigrant who has committed an
"aggravated felony" is deportable at any time.10 3  Contrary to the
image that the term "aggravated felony" conjures up, this category
includes many nonviolent offenses. Congress added the aggravated
felony provision in 1988, four years following Lopez-Mendoza, and
its definition is expansive. Since the addition of the provision,
immigrants may be deportable for what many would view as minor
offenses, including "selling $10 worth of marijuana or 'smuggling'
one's baby sister across the border illegally. ' 10 4 In addition, several
misdemeanor offenses, such as petit larceny and simple assault
offenses, 10 5 are classified as aggravated felonies for the purposes of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 1
06
It is therefore doubtful that the provision, which "includes many
crimes that bear little relation to an actual threat to public safety,"'
107
protects the United States from dangerous criminals. Rather, the
aggravated felony provision is a tool for ICE, in conjunction with
local law enforcement, to use deportation to exacerbate the criminal
punishment of incarceration. The Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez-Mendoza makes this possible: Because deportation is termed
purely civil, it is seen as separate and distinct from criminal
punishment.
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006).
104. HING, supra note 10, at 57.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting the court's
"misgivings that Congress, in its zeal to deter deportable non-citizens from re-entering this
country, has improvidently, if not inadvertently, broken the historic line of division between
felonies and misdemeanors") (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. HING, supra note 10, at 57.
107. Id. at 55 (citing Valerie Neal, Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune: The
Deportation of "Aggravated Felons, " 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1619 (2003)).
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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "[flew punishments
are more drastic and final than expelling a person from his country
when their family members are residents." 108 To many with few
family ties in their home countries, deportation is a harsher
punishment than incarceration. Therefore, changes such as the
heightened prosecution of illegal reentry and the implementation of
the aggravated felony provision have allowed our system of
immigration law to use immigration status as a basis for imposing
disparate punishment for criminal offenses. In light of the expansion
of bases for deportation, ICE policies rooted in racial profiling, in
which the agency uses race as a proxy for immigration status, have
taken an enormous toll on communities of color.
D. ICE's Official Conflation of Criminal and Immigrant
Statuses
In February 2005, ICE launched "Operation Community Shield,"
which has contributed to an atmosphere under which immigration
status itself becomes a factor in determining criminality. ICE
describes Operation Community Shield as "a national law
enforcement initiative that targets violent transnational street gangs
through the use of ICE's broad law enforcement powers, including
the unique and powerful authority to remove (deport) criminal aliens,
including illegal aliens and legal permanent resident aliens."' 0 9 Yet,
nowhere in ICE's description of Operation Community Shield does
the agency define "violent transnational street gangs." Resulting
from Operation Community Shield's reliance on ICE's collaborative
effort with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to
identify gang members, the permissible levels of consideration of
race are increasingly indistinguishable between the immigration and
general law enforcement contexts.
Because immigration agents are permitted to consider race more
liberally than typical law enforcement officers, this blurring of the
line between crime control and immigration law enforcement has
created an immigration enforcement policy under which the
108. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 n. 11, (9th Cir. 1993).
109. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Operation Community Shield,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/investigations/comshield/index.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
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permissibility of the use of race is increasingly vague. In addition,
Operation Community Shield relies on local police forces to identify
gang members, and officers often base these determinations on
"loosely defined or subjective criteria."''110 Because neither the INA
nor ICE has defined "criminal street gang," local law enforcement
officials are unconstrained by federal immigration law in their
identification of gang members,111 and they may "shut down gang
activities - actual or perceived - without any evidence of criminal
wrongdoing." 112 The constitutionality of this program is called into
question by a Supreme Court decision which found a similar anti-
gang city ordinance unconstitutionally vague because it "set a net
large enough to catch all possible offenders ... providing absolute
discretion to police officers to decide what activities" are
impermissible. 11
3
Through Operation Community Shield, after local law
enforcement have apprehended suspected immigration violators and
turned them over to ICE, "ICE is able to use immigration law to
remove immigration violators identified as suspected associates of a
street gang even where state law provides no possible basis for
criminally prosecuting those individuals." ' 1 4  Thus, Operation
Community Shield creates a loophole under which local law
enforcement effectively targets immigrants who have no criminal
history and pose no threat to the community. The conflation of these
conflicting law enforcement duties has taken a huge toll on the
wrong people: the government has deported seventy percent of those
removed under Operation Community Shield based on immigration
violations alone, without bringing criminal charges.' 15  Operation
Community Shield has essentially criminalized immigrant status
both by expanding application of criminal punishment to
110. Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Workers Caught in a Net Cast for Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2007, § I at 41.
111. Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 70 at 330.
112. Id. at 342.
113. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60-61 (1999). The statute at issue was a
Chicago ordinance whose purpose was to address "the burgeoning presence of street gang
members in public places[, which] has intimidated many law abiding citizens." Id. at 46. To
accomplish this goal, the statute prohibited "criminal street gang members" from "loitering" -
defined as "remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose" - in any public place. Id. at
46-47.
114. Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 70 at 332.
115. Id.
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immigration law violators, and by punishing criminal violations
through deportation. 11
6
A recent sweep under Operation Community Shield in
Greenport, New York exposes the deep flaws resulting from the
invitation for law enforcement officers to target individuals based on
vague criteria. On September 27, 2007, federal immigration agents
arrested eleven men under the guise of Operation Community
Shield.' 17 Of these eleven arrestees, ten were not associated with
gangs and had no criminal records, but instead were accused of
immigration violations." 8 Greenport's mayor criticized Operation
Community Shield for focusing on the "gang issue [as a means of
keeping] the white majority scared about the Latino population...
[allowing ICE] to come in and bust as many people as they want." 19
Furthermore, the looseness of the guidelines for identifying
suspects has led to armed immigration raids on the wrong homes.
When officers find that they have entered the home of someone who
was not intended as a subject of the raid, ICE justifies collateral
arrests of any undocumented immigrant as part of the agency's
mission. 12  While the Greenport operation's targeting of the wrong
homes led to collateral arrests of ten immigrants suspected of
immigration violations, agents unsurprisingly did not question
residents who did not appear to be Latino about their immigration
status. 121
To deter public criticism against enforcement efforts that target
immigrants based on race, the federal government has attempted to
convince the public of the dangers of illegal immigration. Professor
Jennifer Chac6n argues that contemporary immigration policy blurs
the line between three distinct groups: undocumented immigrants;
"criminal aliens"; and those who threaten national security. 122
Because government and media increasingly obscure the boundaries
between illegal immigration, general crime, and the threat of
116. Id. at 336.
117. Bernstein, supra note 110.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Jennifer Chac6n, Commentary: Blurred Boundaries in Immigration: Unsecured
Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1827, 1834 (2007) [hereinafter Chac6n, Blurred Boundaries].
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terrorism, "the expanded and accelerated removal of non-citizens is
presented, incorrectly, as an answer to all of these problems."' 
23
Moreover, the blurring of these three groups undermines
homeland security, since efforts designed to target one of these
groups are ineffective against others. For example, all of the
September 1 1th hijackers, who undoubtedly fall into the category of
"those who threaten national security," were legally present in the
United States and had no previous criminal convictions.
1 24
Therefore, they would not be vulnerable to enforcement efforts
against undocumented immigrants and criminal aliens. Instead of
attempting to merge these distinct groups, a prudent homeland
security policy would separately address each one.
This confusion of distinct federal law enforcement concerns is
consistent with immigration law that broadly defines "national
security" to encompass "national defense, foreign relations, or
economic interests of the United States."' 25 From this definition,
one may logically conclude that in addition to preventing terrorist
threats, the job of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is
to fashion policy that protects the economy, which makes
undocumented workers increasingly vulnerable. Such a broad and
malleable definition of "national security" has made the removal of
noncitizens and general criminal law enforcement integral
components to national security.
Consistent with this expanded understanding of national security,
our government and the popular media have conflated illegal
immigration and criminality.' 26  From statements in prominent
newspapers such as "immigration chaos is spreading a subculture of
criminality across America,"127 to the President's warning that illegal
immigration "strains state and local budgets, and brings crime to our
community,"' 128 the message is clear: immigration status alone may
render undesirable the presence of entire communities.
123. Id. at 1831.
124. HING, supra note 10 at 46.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(d)(2) (2006).
126. See Chac6n, Blurred Boundaries, supra note 122 at 1849-50.
127. David Brooks, Editorial, Two Steps Toward a Sensible Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2005, § 4, at 12.
128. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (May 15,
2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/rcleases/2006/ 05/20060515-8.html.
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What DHS does not tell us is that empirical data strongly suggest
that noncitizen status and criminality actually are inversely related.
The Migration Policy Institute's 2006 study utilized 2000 Census
data to demonstrate a trend that is consistent nationwide: Immigrants
have lower incarceration rates than the American born. 129 Foreign-
born men are half as likely to be incarcerated as their white, native
born counterparts.' This statistic is particularly striking for men
ages eighteen to thirty-nine: Whereas the incarceration rate for
American-born men in this age group is 3.51 percent, that for
foreign-born men is 0.68 percent. 13 The authors of the study aptly
observed: "Of particular interest is the finding that the lowest
incarceration rates among Latin American immigrants are seen for
the least educated groups: Salvadorans and Guatemalans (0.52%),
and Mexicans (0.70%). These are precisely the groups most
stigmatized as 'illegals' in the public perception and outcry about
immigration."' 132  In conclusion, lower incarceration rates for
immigrants as compared to natives "applies to every ethnic group
without exception."
133
The Immigration Policy Center confirmed the above statistics for
men ages eighteen to thirty-nine, and observed that "these patterns
have been observed consistently over the last three decennial
censuses, a period that spans the current era of mass immigration."1 34
In addition, a New York Times op-ed piece described a compelling
study which found, after controlling for extrinsic factors such as
poverty, that "living in a neighborhood of concentrated immigration
is directly associated with lower violence." 135 The researchers in this
study analyzed 3,000 violent acts committed by whites, African
Americans, and Mexican Americans in 180 Chicago neighborhoods
129. Ruben G. Rumbaut, et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment
Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men (Migration Policy Institute June 1, 2006),
available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/ feature/print.cfm?ID=403.
130. Id.
131. Id. This calculation for "foreign-born" men excludes Puerto Ricans, who are American
citizens by birth.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Ruben G. Rumbaut, et al., The Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of
Assimilation: Incarceration Rates among Native and Foreign-Born Men (Immigration Policy
Center, Spring 2007).
135. Robert J. Sampson, Open Doors Don't Invite Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at
A15.
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"ranging from highly segregated to very integrated." 136 The study,
which found a significantly lower rate of violence among Mexican
Americans than among African Americans and whites, concluded
that as compared to third-generation Americans, first-generation
immigrants were 45 percent and second-generation immigrations 22
percent less likely to commit violence. 1
37
Finally, a 2008 Public Policy Institute of California study found
that native-born California men ages eighteen to forty are ten times
more likely than their immigrant counterparts to be institutionalized
in. 138 This study also noted that between 2000 and 2005, "cities that
had a higher share of recent immigrants saw their crime rates fall
further than cities with a lower share. This finding is especially
strong when it comes to violent crime."' 39 In light of the mounting
data on the inverse relationship between immigrant status and
criminal conduct, ICE's aggressive enforcement policies not only
improperly target law-abiding immigrant communities, but they are
an entirely misdirected waste of law enforcement resources.
VI. Whom Does This Immigration Policy Harm?
By equating immigration and criminality, ICE has successfully
established programs such as Operation Community Shield, 141 in
which local law enforcement and federal immigration officials
combine forces to engage in what is somehow legally permissible -
though deplorable - racial profiling. The people most vulnerable to
these operations are not those who pose threats to national security.
Rather, ICE raids and other enforcement efforts target individuals
who are easily deportable, even if they have no criminal history.
Children and families are disproportionately suffering from ICE's
escalation in enforcement, regardless of whether they pose any threat
to national security concerns. The following case studies serve as a
brief illustration of the ways in which immigration enforcement is
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Crime, Corrections, and California: What
Does Immigration Have to Do with It?, 9 PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. 1, 2 (2008).
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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dismantling families but failing to secure our nation from terrorism
or even from crime in general.
A. Kebin Reyes
In the early morning hours on March 6, 2007, immigration
officials conducted a series of raids in San Rafael and Novato, two
suburban towns in Marin County, California. 14 1 San Rafael Mayor
Al Boro condemned the raids as a scare tactic rather than a means of
effective law enforcement, noting that many of those targeted had
contributed to and invested in the community. 142  Local school
attendance data demonstrate the raids' startling effect on families:
Seventy-seven children were absent from the local elementary school
on the day of the raids, as opposed to the usual three or four. 143
Jenny Callaway, a San Rafael school board member, expressed
concern that the raids would prevent teachers from complying with
their "charge to provide a quality education regardless of
citizenship."' 144 However, in addition to immigrant children, United
States citizen children suffered from these raids, and they continue to
suffer from ICE's enforcement efforts. During the raid, six-year-old
Kebin Reyes, a citizen, was arrested with his father Noe, a
Guatemalan immigrant. Despite the fact that Noe immediately gave
the ICE agents his son's American passport, an agent informed Noe
that both he and Kebin would be taken into custody. 14  ICE
repeatedly denied Noe's request to call a family member who could
care for Kebin while his father was taken into custody.146  A
complaint filed on Kebin's behalf alleges that he was taken into
141. Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Bay Area Reacts Angrily to Series of Immigration
Raids, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2007, at A14.
142. Id.
143. Immigration Agents Raid San Rafael Apartments, http://cbs5.com/localV
san.rafael.immigration.2.453228.htm (follow "Featured Story" video clip) (last visited Nov. 10,
2008).
144. McKinley, supra note 141.
145. American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Rights Groups Sue Immigration Officials
for Unlawfully Detaining Six-Year-Old US. Citizen, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants /detention/
29526prs20070426.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
146. Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution at 3, Kebin Reyes ex rel Noe Reyes v. Alcantar, available at
http://www.aclunc.org/cases (follow Closed Cases hyperlink; then follow "Reyes v. Alcanter
[sic]").
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custody without lawful cause and without a warrant for his arrest. 147
Kebin's complaint further alleges that ICE officers "held him in
a locked room all day against his will.. . refus[ing] to give [him]
any food, other than bread and water." 148 Following the detention,
Kebin's father described the trauma that Kebin experienced:
"Before the arrest, my son was very friendly and would speak to
most anyone .... Since the day of the arrest, Kebin has turned to be
very reserved and quiet and not as open to speak to anyone."
' 149
Kebin's attorney added, "Kebin thought he was in jail - this was
clearly a traumatic incident for him .... Over six weeks have
passed, and Kebin is still having nightmares." 1
50
Unfortunately, Kebin's situation is not unique. The National
Council of La Raza ("NCLR") studied the effects on children of
three ICE workplace raids conducted in 2007 in Greeley, Colorado,
Grand Island, Nebraska, and New Bedford, Massachusetts.
151
NCLR found that the 912 workers arrested had a total of 506
children. Although the study does not perfectly reflect national
trends, NCLR estimates that the number of children directly affected
by a parent or caregiver's arrest during a worksite raid is roughly half
the number of adults arrested.152 Although NCLR was unable to
obtain data on the citizenship of the affected children in the Grand
Island and New Bedford raids, 66 percent of those affected by the
Greeley raid were United States citizens, which is consistent with
national data. 15
3
B. The New Bedford Raid
In addition to residential raids like the one resulting in Kebin's
arrest, ICE has increased its operation of workplace raids. 54  On
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. McKinley, supra note 141.
150. American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 145.
151. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, PAYING THE PRICE: THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN (2007).
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 18.
154. See, e.g., U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: How ICE COULD IMPROVE CONTROLS TO HELP
GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING 2 (October 2007) (noting that "the number of
Winter 20091 ON THIN ICE
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
March 6, 2006, immigration officials raided a factory in New
Bedford, Massachusetts, arresting 361 immigrants. 155  The parents
and caregivers of 113 children were arrested during this raid, 156 and
sixty of the individuals detained stated that they were their children's
sole caregivers. 157 As the detainees - mostly women - were flown
to a holding center in Texas to await deportation proceedings,
community activists scrambled to offer support for fathers unfamiliar
with infant care. 1 58 One woman, whose daughter was in frail health
from an illness that interferes with her ability to absorb nutrition,
learned after three days in detention that the child had missed a
doctor's appointment to discuss inserting a feeding tube. 159
Although ICE Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security Julie
Myers stated that the sixty sole caregivers were released in the days
following the raid, families were dismantled as ICE sent over 200
arrestees to detention centers in Texas and New Mexico.' 60 During
the days following the raid, events such as a seven-year-old's
hysterical call to a hotline in search of her mother and a
breastfeeding baby's hospitalization due to dehydration, prompted
Massachusetts' Governor Deval Patrick to declare a "humanitarian
crisis."'161  Governor Patrick acknowledged the importance of
immigration law enforcement but criticized ICE for "rac[ing
detainees] to the airport" when children and families are torn
apart. 162
Since 2006, workplace enforcement operations such as the New
Bedford raid have spiked in numbers. The total arrests resulting
from workplace ICE raids increased from under 600 in 2002 and
worksite enforcement arrests increased from 510 in fiscal year 2002 to 4,383 in fiscal year
2006").
155. Robin Shulman, Immigration Raid Rips Families; Illegal Workers in Massachusetts
Separated From Children, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007, at A06.
156. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 151.
157. Raja Mishra & Brian R. Bailout, DSS to Check on Detainees Sent to Texas; Some
Workers' Children May Lack Care, Officials Fear, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2007, at Al.
158. Monica Rhor, Raids Leave Children Without Parents: Illegal Immigrants May Get
Rounded Up, but U.S.-Born Offspring Have Right to Stay, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2007, at
A3.
159. Shulman, supra note 155.
160. Rhor, supra note 158.
161. Shulman, supra note 155.
162. Mishra & Ballou, supra note 157.
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2003, to almost 850 in 2004, to nearly 1,300 in 2005.' 63  These
arrests then surged: workplace raids yielded 4,383 arrests in 2006,
and 4,940 were arrested in 2007.164 Notably, in light of ICE's
increased emphasis on "criminal aliens" through enforcement efforts
such as Operation Community Shield, only 17 percent of the 2007
arrests were criminal, and the remainder were administrative. Not
coincidentally, this spike in workplace enforcement has continued in
the context of increased pressure on the federal government
following Congress' failure to pass comprehensive immigration
reform. 16f
C. Saida Umanzor
As the federal government has engaged in heightened
immigration enforcement following the failure of the House and
Senate to arrive at an immigration reform compromise, children and
families continue to suffer. On October 26, 2007, immigration
agents detained Saida Umanzor, a twenty-six-year-old Honduran
woman who was illegally present in the United States.' 66  Ms.
Umanzor was breastfeeding her nine-month-old daughter Brittney
when agents detained her and placed the baby - who had been fed
only breast milk before the arrest - in the custody of social
workers. 167 Ms. Umanzor spent eleven days in jail, the first three of
which she had no access to a breast pump. 168 Meanwhile, Brittney
did not eat for three days, refusing to take formula from a bottle. 1
69
Including Brittney, Ms. Umanzor has three children, all of whom
are American citizens.170  ICE raided her home with a criminal
warrant for her brother-in-law, and detained her when they
discovered a July 2006 deportation order.171 Although Ms. Umanzor
163. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2008) (statistics are
current as of Oct. 15, 2007).
164. Id.
165. See Pear & Huse, supra note 7.
166. Julia Preston, Case of Mother Torn From Baby Reflects Immigration Quandary, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at Al.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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failed to appear in immigration court after she was caught illegally
crossing the border near Texas, she had no criminal record."'
In response to intense criticism from women's health advocates,
Julie Myers, ICE's Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security,
released a memorandum guiding ICE agents in their consideration of
humanitarian issues and their exercise of discretion when making
arrest and custody determinations for nursing mothers.173 In her
memo, Myers urges ICE agents and officers to "use discretion in
identifying and responding to meritorious health related cases and
caregiver issues."'1 74 She further urges agents to consider possible
alternatives to detention if they determine that a nursing mother does
not pose a threat to "public safety or other investigative interests."175
VII. Possible Avenues for Reform
As is evident from the case studies of Kebin Reyes, the New
Bedford raid, and Saida Umanzor, immigration enforcement
operations have disadvantaged families, and have targeted people
who pose no threat to what the everyday citizen understands as
"national security." Furthermore, these operations are
disproportionately directed at people of color. In its 2008 report on
ICE enforcement efforts, the National Network for Immigrant and
Refugee Rights ("NNIRR") highlighted case after case in which ICE
overtly targets people of color, particularly Latinos. The NNIRR
Report recounts the story of a subject of a December 2006 workplace
raid in Utah, describing the ICE agents as "checking only the people
that looked Latina or Latino," allowing the white people to leave.
176
In Washington state (which permits individuals to drive with foreign
licenses for up to one year), police increasingly refer holders of
Mexican licenses to ICE, and allow those with Canadian licenses to
continue on their way.177
172. Id.
173. Memorandum: Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion, from Julie L. Myers, Assistant
Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with author).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. NAT'L NETWORK OF IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 7.
177. Id. at 39.
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The National Hispanic Leadership Agenda has found similar
evidence of racial profiling, noting that "[w]ith the recent boom in
the Latino population throughout the South, highway patrols are
stopping Latinos ... and waving through whites."178 Because ICE
consistently relies on race and does not take adequate measures to
protect families, a complete reformation of ICE enforcement policy
is imperative.
A. Legislative Reform
In 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy stated that the unification of immigrant families "serves the
national interest not only through the humaneness of the policy itself,
but also through the promotion of the public order and well-being of
the nation." 179 However, today's aggressive immigration policy has
taken an enormous toll on hardworking immigrant families. In a plea
for federal immigration reform legislation, Ninth Circuit Judge Harry
Pregerson declared, "I pray that soon the good men and women in
our Congress will ameliorate the plight of [immigrant] families...
and give us humane laws that will not cause the disintegration of
such families."1
80
Possibly in response to this plea, as well as the increasing toll
that immigration enforcement has taken on immigrant families,
Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts and Congresswoman Hilda
Solis of California introduced the Families First Immigration
Enforcement Act' 81 ("the bill" or "the Families First legislation") to
their respective chambers of Congress. Although the Senate bill has
made no progress since its introduction, the House bill has fourteen
co-sponsors 82 and it has been referred to the Subcommittee on
178. NAT'L HISPANIC LEADERSHIP AGENDA, How THE LATINO COMMUNITY'S AGENDA ON
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND REFORM HAS SUFFERED SINCE 9/11 12 (2004).
179. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, FINAL REPORT
OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 112 (1981).
180. Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (dissenting opinion).
181. The House and Senate bills are identical: S. 2074, 109th Cong. (2007), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cl 10:S.2074:; H.R. 3980, 109th Cong. (2007), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ query/D?cl 10:1 :./ temp/-c 11 OjUVJ IQ::.
182. The House co-sponsors are: Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Sam Farr of California, Chaka
Fattah of Pennsylvania, Raul Grijalva of Arizona, Luis Gutierrez of Illinois, Ruben Hinojosa of
Texas, Jim McDermott of Washington, James McGovern of Massachusetts, Ed Pastor of Arizona,
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Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and
International Law.
The bill's purpose is to "provide for safe and humane policies
and procedures pertaining to the arrest, detention, and processing of
aliens in immigration enforcement operations."'1 83  It provides for
various mechanisms to ensure that immigration officials consider the
humanitarian and social service needs of the communities whom
their enforcement operations target. The bill requires that DHS
cooperate with local officials so that they may notify state social
services agencies of the details of planned raids.184 In addition, it
calls for cooperation between DHS and state social service agencies
so that they may inform appropriate nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") on the day of the enforcement action.' 85  The social
service agency, rather than DHS, would be vested with the discretion
to determine the level of participation in post-raid interviews of NGO
representatives who speak the detainees' native language.' 
86
The Families First legislation would require DHS to provide
social service officials with "unfettered and confidential access" to
detainees. 187  The purpose of this access would be to determine
"whether the detainee, the detainee's children, or other vulnerable
people, including elderly and disabled individuals, have been placed
at risk as a result of the detainee's arrest. ' 188 The bill also calls for
the Division of Immigration Health Services of the Department of
Health and Human Services to screen detainees for medical issues or
other bases for humanitarian release.'
1 89
The Families First Immigration Enforcement Act would require
DHS to consider numerous factors in determining whether a detainee
should be released. In addition to the detainee's medical issues,
DHS would be required to consider the Division of Immigration
Health Services and the applicable state social service agency's
Lucille Roybal-Allard of California, Albio Sires of New Jersey, Fortney Pete Stark of California,
Mark Udall of Colorado, and Lynn Woolsey of California.
183. Library of Congress, H.R. 3980, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?dl 10:HR03980:@@@P.
184. Families First Immigration Enforcement Act, H.R. 3980, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2007).
185. Id. at § 3(c).
186. Id. at § 3(c)(2).
187. Id. at § 3(d).
188. Id.
189. Id. at § 3(f).
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recommendations for release of minors, pregnant women, nursing
mothers, sole caretakers of minor children or elderly relatives, those
whose spouses are ill or otherwise unable to be the sole caretaker,
and those whose spouses need support in caring for sick or special-
needs children. 190 Finally, the bill would require DHS to provide,
and advertise in the mainstream and foreign language media, a toll-
free number for detainees' family members to contact.'
1 91
The Families First legislation is consistent with the Immigration
and Nationality Act's overarching theme of family unity and
integrity. For example, in outlining various immigration violations,
the INA expressly provides for the exemption of immediate family
members from its definition of alien "smuggling." The INA
classifies as deportable "[a]ny alien who ... knowingly has
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to
enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law."
' 192
However, the Act expressly "assure[s] family unity" for immigrants
who have "encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the
alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to
enter the United States in violation of law.'' 193 Depending on the
length of their presence in the United States, such individuals are
automatically exempted from the smuggling provision, or, in the
alternative, the Attorney General has discretion to waive the
smuggling provision. 194
The Act provides for the allocation of immigrant visas on a
preferred basis for family-sponsored immigrants, which include the
spouses, adult children, minor children, and siblings of United States
citizens and legal residents. 195  The Act also provides for the
consideration of family ties when the Attorney General contemplates
cancellation of removal after an immigrant has been established
inadmissible or deportable. 196 When a non-permanent resident has
been ordered removed, the Attorney General may cancel removal
and adjust the immigrant's status if he or she, inter alia, "establishes
190. Families First Immigration Enforcement Act, H.R. 3980, 109th Cong. § 3(f) (2007).
191. Id. at § 3(g).
192. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(1)(E)(i) (2006).
193. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(i)(E)(ii) - (iii) (2006).
194. Id.
195.8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006).
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).
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that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence."'' 97  Furthermore, the Attorney General's discretion to
consider family unity becomes a mandate in certain cases of parents
and children who have been victims of domestic violence.' 
98
These examples from the Immigration and Nationality Act
demonstrate the respect for family unity that provides the foundation
for our immigration law and policy, a theme that various courts have
recognized in their immigration decisions. The Ninth Circuit has
stated that the determination of hardship on a spouse, parent, or child
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) must be made against the backdrop of
"the importance and centrality of the family in American life[,
which] is firmly established both in our traditions and our
jurisprudence."1 99  To build on this theme, the court cited Supreme
Court precedent, international legal doctrine, and the legislative
history of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 00  Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit has stated that "the relevance of close family ties seems
implicit in the. . . 'extreme hardship' [provision]. 2 1  The BIA has
likewise recognized the importance of family unity, holding that in
evaluating the hardship that United States citizen children would
suffer in the event of their parent's deportation, courts must
"consider the totality of the burden on the entire family."2 0 2
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (2006).
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(4) (2006).
199. Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the court in
Cerrillo-Perez was interpreting "hardship" under a lower standard than the current Immigration
and Nationality Act ("extreme hardship" versus "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"),
its analysis is still proper. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("the Board") has stated that, while
the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard is stricter than the "extreme hardship"
standard, the new standard "is clearly less than unconscionable." In re Francisco Javier Monreal-
Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 61 (BIA 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board
went on to state that courts must consider the same factors under the "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" standard as they did under the "extreme hardship" standard, but "they must be
weighed according to the higher standard required." Id. at 63.
200. Cerrillo-Perez, 809 F.2d at 1423 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977), in which the Supreme Court stated that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because it is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition"; a House Report
stating that Congress "was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States
citizens and immigrants united" when it passed the INA; and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights).
201. Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 1983).
202. In re Ariadna Angelica Gonzalez Recinas, 23 1. & N. Dec. 467, 472 (BIA 2002).
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Immigration reform on the legislative level has proven to be a
203
challenging, and likely impracticable, feat. Today's political
climate makes the possibility of pro-immigrant legislation that
commands the votes of a majority of both chambers of Congress
look bleak.
B. Executive Reform Through ICE's Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion
Because Congress has failed to pass immigration reform
legislation, ICE continues to exercise vast discretion in custody and
detention decisions. All too often, this discretion results in improper
consideration of race in immigration law enforcement decisions. As
detailed above, the Department of Justice's policy guiding federal
immigration officers' consideration of race purports to restrict racial
profiling. However, in practice, it allows ICE enormous flexibility in
relying on race in immigration law enforcement. Rather than
capitalize on this flexibility to engage in heightened racial profiling,
ICE should look to the mountainous data that demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of racial profiling as a law enforcement tool.
The available data demonstrate that racial profiling in the general
law enforcement context does not yield more evidence of criminal
activity than a nonracist practice would. A 2003 statewide study of
Minnesota law enforcement practices found that "Blacks, Latinos
and American Indians are more likely than whites to be stopped by
police and searched but much less likely to be found with anything
illegal., 20 4 In response to these findings, Minnesota's Commissioner
of Public Safety stated that "[t]hese numbers ... are consistent with
data from other states." 20 5  Indeed, an Illinois study reflected the
same trends: in routine traffic stops in 2007, police agencies received
consent to search from Black drivers three times more often than
white drivers, and Latino drivers more than twice as often.20 6
203. See, e.g., Pear & Huse, supra note 7.
204. Conrad deFiebre, Study: Bias Likely in Cop Stops, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sept. 25,
2003 at, IA.
205. Id.
206. Monique Garcia & Ray Long, Study Sees Racial Bias in Traffic-Stop Searches,
CHICAGO TRIB., July 24, 2008, at 1.
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However, police discovered contraband roughly twice as often when
white drivers agreed to searches.
20 7
Consistent with these studies of individual states, the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") issued findings in 2005 regarding police contacts
with the public. The DOJ study found that "white, black, and
Hispanic drivers were stopped by police at similar rates, while blacks
and Hispanics were more likely than whites to be searched ....
Police found evidence of criminal wrong-doing... in 11.6% of
searches." 2° 8  Perhaps not coincidentally, the DOJ study does not
conduct a racial analysis of the cases in which the police discovered
evidence of criminal wrongdoing in these searches. However, one
may assume that the statistics mirror the state trends, which indicate
that racial profiling in traffic stops is ineffective as a law
enforcement tool because police are more likely to discover evidence
of criminality among white drivers.
In addition to the demonstrated ineffectiveness of racial profiling
in terms of detection of criminal wrongdoing, such tactics in
immigration law enforcement are ineffective from a policy
perspective. Specifically, numerous studies have found that racial
profiling leads to community distrust of police. 20 9 Representatives
of law enforcement agencies nationwide have expressed reluctance
to enter formal agreements with ICE to enforce immigration law
because "they fear losing the trust of immigrant communities and
worry about being accused of racial profiling."
210
207. Id.
208. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005 at 1 (United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2007).
209. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs,
Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 SOC. RES. 445, 453 (July 1, 2006)
(presenting "strong evidence of distrust and disillusionment" with police who disproportionately
target people of color in the war on drugs); Addressing Gang Violence: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the.Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2008) (testimony of Frank G. Straub, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety)
(stating that the use of racial profiling "and other aggressive police tactics in communities of
color has created and/or reinforced distrust of the police"); Antigone Barton & Christine
Stapleton, Drug-Free Zones Target Blacks Unfairly, Critics Say, PALM BEACH POST, July 1,
2007 ("Racial profiling ... [has contributed] to longer prison sentences for black offenders and
distrust of law enforcement in black communities").
210. Pamela Constable, Many Officials Reluctant to Help Arrest Immigrants, WASHINGTON
POST, Aug. 23, 2008 at BO.
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Accordingly, ICE should decline to engage in racial profiling in
its enforcement policies. Especially with the mounting number of
American citizens who fit the Brignoni-Ponce Court's nebulous
standard of "apparent Mexican ancestry," 211 ICE should anticipate
that selectively targeting subjects based on race will be as ineffective
in the immigration enforcement context as it is in criminal law
enforcement.
Furthermore, racial profiling will instill in the immigrant
community distrust of all law enforcement officials, be they
immigration or general law enforcement officers. Such fear and
distrust will make immigrants reluctant to report crime, destabilizing
immigrant communities and rendering them less safe. This result is
contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which exempts
certain undocumented individuals from removability if they are
"helpful to a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official...
investigating or prosecuting criminal activity." 21 2  The statute
provides relief as a reward for cooperation with law enforcement in
the investigation of a broad category of crimes, including rape,
torture, trafficking, domestic violence, sexual assault, kidnapping,
blackmail, extortion, homicide, assault, obstruction of justice, and
213perjury. Although the Department of Homeland Security has
attempted to restrict the categories of crimes for which such relief
would be available in exchange for cooperation with law
enforcement, 2 14 the language of the Act makes clear Congress'
desire that immigration status not be a basis to dissuade such
cooperation. Selective immigration law enforcement based on race,
resulting in mounting distrust and tension between immigrants and
officers, is in direct conflict with this congressional objective.
211. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
212. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(U) (2006).
213. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (2006). This section of the Act is commonly referred to
as the "U" Visa provision.
214. In September of 2007, the Department of Homeland Security issued an interim rule
stating that the "U" Visa's purpose is "to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to
investigate and prosecute such crimes as domestic violence, sexual assault, and trafficking in
persons, while offering protection to alien crime victims in keeping with the humanitarian
interests of the United States." New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility
for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53014-01 (proposed Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a and 299).
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In addition to the wisdom of electing not to engage in racial
profiling, ICE should look to Julie Myers's memorandum addressing
prosecutorial discretion. This memo provides the foundation for a
concrete alternative to legislative immigration reform: The
promulgation of regulations governing the exercise of discretion
when the subject of enforcement operations has no criminal history,
poses no threat to public safety, and whose family situation presents
humanitarian concerns.
The Myers memo was in part a response to the pressure from
community groups surrounding the detention of Saida Umanzor. As
the memo's predecessor nowhere mentions family unity in its
discussion of prosecutorial discretion, 2 15 Myers's message signals
progress in the struggle to prevent the disintegration of immigrant
families. However, an internal memorandum to immigration officers
is by definition a guidance document, and does not bind ICE officers
to its suggestions. Notwithstanding the Myers Memorandum, a
humane immigration law and policy must stem from more than
ICE's adoption of guidelines to govern its agents' exercise of
discretion. Courts are highly deferential to agencies' decisions
whether to enforce their regulations,216 and guidance documents are
generally unenforceable.217
215. See Memorandum: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, from Doris Meissner,
Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (Nov. 7, 2000) (on file with author)
(outlining definition of prosecutorial discretion and urging officers to exercise it in the context of
INS's overall goals: "protecting public safety, promoting the integrity of the legal immigration
system, and deterring violations of immigration law").
216. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (stating that the Court "has recognized
on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion") (internal citations omitted).
217. The Administrative Procedure Act exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, [and] rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from the general requirements
of administrative agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006). Courts have interpreted
this exemption to mean that guidance documents must be afforded substantial deference. See,
e.g., Air Transport Ass'n v. F.A.A., 291 F.3d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that an agency's
"interpretation of its own regulation ... must be afforded substantial deference and upheld unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation") (internal citations omitted). Compounding
this deferential standard is the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron v. N.R.D.C. that an agency
interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing need not reflect wise policy; rather it
need only be "reasonable" in light of an explicit or implicit "gap left open by Congress." 467
U.S. 837, 866 (1984). These multiple levels of judicial deference allow agencies vast flexibility
in their enforcement policies and practices.
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In a 2007 Report, the Government Accountability Office
("GAO") outlined some of the problems with relying on agency
memoranda to effect reform in the exercise of prosecutorial
218discretion. The GAO Report states that ICE's efforts to create
guidelines around the exercise of discretion are "not comprehensive
and up to date." 219 Most notably, "despite a sharp increase in ICE's
worksite ... operations in recent years," guidelines for officers "do
not comprehensively address humanitarian.., issues associated with
these operations." 220  Because ICE's guidance documents and
training materials do not "instruct officers on how to identify and
process aliens with humanitarian issues in large worksite
,,221
operations, immigrant children and families profoundly suffer
from officers' failure to consider family unity during these
operations.
Even if ICE adopts enforcement guidelines that recognize the
value in maintaining family unity, undocumented immigrants have
minimal power to challenge the agency's failure to comply with such
guidelines. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, the Supreme Court examined the rights of undocumented
immigrants to challenge the government's selective enforcement
based on affiliation with a politically unpopular group.22 2 A claim of
selective enforcement is distinct from "a defense on the merits to the
criminal charge itself; . . . [rather, it is] an independent assertion that
the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the
Constitution., 223  Without determining the merits of the selective
enforcement claim, the Court held that undocumented immigrants,
whose very presence in the United States is a violation of
immigration laws, have no defense of unconstitutionally selective
enforcement. 224
As many selective enforcement claims challenge race-based
selection, the Court's decision has huge implications for immigrants
218. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: How ICE COULD IMPROVE CONTROLS TO HELP
GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING (October 2007).
219. Id. at 7.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 8.
222. 525 U.S. 471, 472 (1999).
223. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).
224. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 488.
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who wish to challenge the pervasive racial profiling in immigration
enforcement efforts. Compounding the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee holding is the fact that the Court has
consistently deferred to DHS' formulation of immigration policy,
noting that the factors making enforcement decisions "ill-suited for
judicial review ... are greatly magnified in the deportation
context."
' 225
C. Judicial Reform: How Do Today's Immigration Enforcement
Trends Coincide With Lopez-Mendoza?
The NNIRR Report demonstrates the racially charged nature
of immigration law enforcement efforts. Relaxed standards allowing
ICE to consider race in its enforcement efforts are disproportionately
detrimental to immigrant families of color. Furthermore, ICE often
conducts its operations under the guise of crime control, despite the
fact that many of those targeted have no criminal record. Not only is
this inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act's broad
respect for family unity, it is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent.
The Supreme Court's holding in Lopez-Mendoza rested
substantially on the fact that deportation proceedings were civil
matters. The Court relied on the "purely civil" nature of
deportation proceedings in concluding that the exclusionary rule
should not apply to them. Indeed, Lopez-Mendoza is only one of
many cases in which the Supreme Court has expressly distinguished
the nature of immigration enforcement from "general crime
control. 227 Precisely because immigration officers do not engage in
general criminal law enforcement, this distinction provides the
rationale for exempting immigration agents from constitutional
standards applied to police officers.
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning immigration agents'
discretion, as well as Congress' longstanding grant of broad power to
the Department of Homeland Security (formerly the Immigration and
Nationality Service), has allowed immigration officials to circumvent
225. Id. at 490 (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463-65).
226. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
227. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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the safeguards normally in place in the law enforcement context. For
example, although it has never expressly held that Miranda warnings
are not required during immigration arrests, the Court in Lopez-
Mendoza noted that numerous circuit courts have held that "the
absence of Miranda warnings does not render an otherwise voluntary
statement by the respondent inadmissible in a deportation case. 228
In affirming this interpretation and limited application of the
Miranda safeguards, the Court paved the way for immigration agents
to elicit incriminating statements to build a deportation case.
In addition, unlike a criminal defendant, an immigrant in a
deportation proceeding is allocated a substantial burden of proof.
Although the government bears the initial burden of proof to
establish deportability by clear and convincing evidence - notably
lower than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard required in
criminal proceedings - the burden then shifts to the immigrant to
establish that he or she qualifies for relief from removal under a
statutory exception. 229  Unlike a criminal proceeding, if an
immigrant fails to appear at a deportation hearing, the proceeding
continues without him or her.
230
Congress' broad power to regulate immigration stems from
its plenary power, 23 1 a doctrine whose development in the
immigration context began in 1889. In the Chinese Exclusion Case,
the Supreme Court noted that "the power of exclusion of foreigners
being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it,
228. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (citing Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st
Cir. 1977): Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519
F.2d 397, 399-401 (7th Cir. 1975)).
229. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(c)(3)(A), 1229(c)(4)(A) (2006).
230. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(5)(A) (2006).
231. See Carrie Arnold, Note: Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local
Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 138 (2007) ("Because
the federal government's immigration power is said to be a plenary power, there is limited
judicial review of immigration laws."); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights,
and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 329 (2002) ("The so-called 'plenary power' doctrine creates a
constitutional immunity from judicial scrutiny of substantive immigration judgments of Congress
and the Executive Branch... allow[ing] the federal government, through the immigration laws,
to lash out at any group considered undesirable.").
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cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one." 232
However, because this doctrine has developed contemporaneously
with a notion that immigration law enforcement is distinct from the
crime control function of regular police, the Court must ensure that
ICE's power is reined in when the agency begins to engage in
general criminal law enforcement.
The September 1 1th attacks, which occurred twenty-five
years after the Court's holding in Lopez-Mendoza, became the basis
for sweeping changes in immigration law. In the weeks following
the attacks, the government immediately capitalized on immigration
proceedings as an alternative to the criminal justice system,
deporting several hundred suspected terrorists on immigration
violations rather than initiating criminal prosecutions. 233 In light of
the steady conflation of general crime control and immigration law
enforcement since September 11 th, the Supreme Court must revisit
the assumption that formed the basis of Lopez-Mendoza: that
immigration proceedings are purely civil.
Through enforcement efforts such as Operation Community
Shield, ICE and criminal law enforcement officers' duties are
merged. The image of the "criminal," traditionally targeted by
police, is merged with the "illegal alien," the subject of immigration
enforcement efforts. This criminalization based on immigration
status has resulted in an expansion of the application of criminal
punishment to those who violate immigration laws, as well as the use
of deportation to punish criminal law violations.234
The Department of Justice's 2003 guidelines regarding racial
profiling in law enforcement are based on an assumption that
"traditional law enforcement activities" and law enforcement that
protects "national security and border integrity" are distinct. This
distinction is turned on its head when Operation Community Shield
provides for ICE's collaboration with local police, who have "no
legal definition of criminal street gang membership to constrain
them., 235  As myriad federal appellate opinions have highlighted
immigration agents' propensity toward racial profiling when
232. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
233. Chac6n, Blurred Boundaries, supra note 122 at 1864 (citing Donald Kerwin, Revisiting
the Need for Appointed Counsel, 4 MPI INSIGHT 1, 3 (2004)).
234. Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 70 at 336.
235. Id. at 340.
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operating under minimal constraints, local police are equally
likely to rely impermissibly on race. Because many arrests resulting
from Operation Community Shield lead to deportation (rather than
criminal) proceedings, the Lopez-Mendoza holding allows police
officers to violate the Fourth Amendment without suffering any
evidentiary consequences. As local police become more involved in
immigration enforcement operations, the objective of the
exclusionary rule - the deterrence of police misconduct - is
undermined.
This surmounting reliance on race, bringing with it a rapid
increase in deportations annually, 237 must be reexamined. The
Lopez-Mendoza Court fashioned the "egregiousness" exception in
the context of an immigration policy that was entirely distinct from
criminal law enforcement. Because Congress, ICE, and the general
public have blurred the distinction between undocumented
immigration and criminality, the Court must revisit its holding in
Lopez-Mendoza. Rather than relaxing the standard for officers'
consideration of race in the immigration law enforcement context -
and subsequently failing to impose evidentiary consequences on
officers who violate the Fourth Amendment during these operations
- the Supreme Court should hold immigration officers to the same
standards as general law enforcement officers.
VIII. Conclusion
According to the 9/11 Commission, homeland security is
strengthened if we send a "message of welcome, tolerance, and
236. See United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that
courts must not give "more than scant weight to [the officer's] subjective impressions" lest the
officer engage in "abuse or overreaching [which] may disparately impact minorities"); Gonzalez-
Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that immigration agents "may use
racial stereotypes as a proxy for illegal conduct without being subjectively aware of doing so");
United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1992) (criticizing an agent's apparent
"rote citations" of factors other than race upon which he relied to stop an individual and
observing that "this profile is so familiar, down to the very verbiage chosen to describe the
suspect, that an inquiring mind may wonder about the recurrence of such fortunate parallelism in
the experiences of the arresting agents").
237. See, e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY
2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 161 tbl.42 (2005) (documenting general increase
in number of removals between 1991 and 2004).
Winter 2009] ON THIN ICE
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
justice to ... immigrant communities.' '23 8 Yet, the post-September
11 th pressure on the federal government to protect our country from
terrorism has produced generalized anti-immigrant law and policy.
Because reform has been stagnant at the legislative level, and
reform on the executive level is minimally promising, the judiciary is
the most appropriate body to protect immigrant families and prevent
immigration officers from improperly considering race in their
enforcement efforts. The Supreme Court must recognize that
deportation proceedings are one component of an immigration policy
that does not merely exaggerate, but misrepresents the relationship
between immigrant status and propensity toward crime. As a result
of this artificial conflation, immigrants are targeted by criminal law
enforcement, and immigration and criminal proceedings are used
interchangeably. Furthermore, immigrants are targeted based on
race, and they are allowed only a narrow avenue to challenge racist
enforcement practices. Such treatment of immigrants, which does
not take account of their potential to pose a threat to public safety, is
harming, rather than strengthening, homeland security.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should recognize that
deportation proceedings are not purely civil, and the exclusionary
rule should apply to them. As the Court declared almost 100 years
ago when it fashioned the exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment
mandates that the judiciary not "affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect ... of the prohibitions of the Constitution.
23 9
Stemming from this, the Court should find that immigration
enforcement operations are no longer distinct from general law
enforcement, and agents should not be permitted to consider race any
more liberally than a general law enforcement officer may.
Immigration reform in this context will mitigate the plight that
immigrant families experience in the face of an increasingly hostile
immigration law and policy. It is through a judicial prohibition of
racial profiling and extension of the exclusionary rule that that the
agencies charged with ensuring homeland security can direct their
efforts toward those who actually threaten the safety of the United
States.
238. THE 9/1l COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 390 (2004).
239. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914).
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